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THE STATUS OF SAME SEX ADOPTION IN
THE KEYSTONE STATE SUBSEQUENT TO
THE STATE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
IN ADOPTION OF R.B.F. AND R.C.G.
Martha Elizabeth Lieberman*
“Today a child who receives proper nutrition, adequate schooling
and supportive sustaining shelter is among the fortunate, whatever
the source. A child who also receives the love and nurture of even
a single parent can be counted among the blessed. Here this Court
finds a child who has all of the above benefits and two adults (a
lesbian couple) dedicated to his welfare, secure in their loving
partnership, and determined to raise him to the very best of their
considerable abilities . . . .”1
INTRODUCTION
The demographic changes in the United States over the past
century make it difficult to describe an average American family.2
Today, a diversity of perspectives on morality and individual
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., Ithaca College, 2000. The
author would like to thank the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy.
1
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (holding that an
unmarried same-sex partner could adopt her partner’s biological child).
2
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (holding that a
Washington state court decision granting grandparents visitation rights to their
grandchildren over the objections of the sole surviving parent—a “fit, custodial
mother”—violated the mother’s substantive due process rights, and finding that
a family can consist of mother and child); See also NANCY E. WALKER ET. AL.,
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1999) (discussing how the term
“family” now includes households where the parents are divorced, households
where grandparents act as parents, and single parent households).
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freedoms has produced a spectrum of views on what constitutes a
family.3 Families whose heads of household are gay or lesbian are
just one part of that spectrum. Between one and nine million
children in the United States are estimated to have at least one gay
or lesbian parent.4 While gay or lesbian couples raise children in
every state, the law, as determined by state government in
Pennsylvania in particular, does not afford them the same parental
rights it affords biological or adoptive parents.5
Numerous gay and lesbian couples, in planning their lives
together, are seeking to adopt children or undergo in vitro6
3

William C. Duncan, Don’t Ever Take a Fence Down: The “Functional”
Definition of Family-Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
57, 66 (2001). Duncan states the following:
In today’s society, where increased mobility, changes in social mores
and increased individual freedom have created a wide spectrum of
arrangements filling the role of the traditional nuclear family, flexibility
in the application of standing principles is required in order to adapt
those principles to the interests of each particular child.
Id. at 66.
4
COMMITTEE ON PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF CHILD AND FAMILY HEALTH,
AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, COPARENT OR SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION BY
SAME-SEX PARENTS (vol. 109, number 3, 2002) (reporting that pediatricians
should make every effort to support second-parent adoption because of its
advantages to the children involved) [hereinafter AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS
REPORT].
5
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2525 (West 2001). The Statute states in
pertinent part:
The court shall cause an investigation to be made and a report filed
by . . . an appropriate person designated by the court . . . . The
investigation shall cover all pertinent information regarding the child’s
eligibility for adoption and the suitability of the placement, including
the physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the child, and
the child’s and the adopting parent’s age, sex, health and racial, ethnic
and religious background.
Id. See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.L.P., 16 Fiduc. Rep.2d 95, 98 (Montg. Co.
Orphans’ Ct. Pa. 1998) (rejecting the application of a lesbian partner to become
an adoptive parent of a child).
6
See MARTHA FIELD, DO NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES THREATEN
THE FAMILY? 34 (1988). Field says that in vitro fertilization:
refers to the process by which a doctor stimulates a woman’s ovaries,
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fertilization to establish families.7 For many of them, gaining
recognition of legal parental status for the same-sex partner of the
natural or adoptive parent has been an intense struggle.8
Alternative families, face a difficult task in becoming integrated
within the confines of existing adoption laws.9 In Pennsylvania, for
removes several eggs in a procedure called a laparoscopy, and fertilizes
them in a Petri dish . . . . Two or three days later, when each egg has
divided a few times the doctor can transfer the eggs to the uterus of the
woman providing the eggs, with the hope of producing a “test-tube”
baby nine months later.
Id.
7

See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that in
vitro fertilization is an alternative insemination technique and that “[t]he woman
or women may choose to become pregnant using sperm from a completely
anonymous donor, from a donor who has agreed to be identifiable when the
child becomes an adult, or from a fully known donor (e.g., a friend or a relative
of the nonconceiving partner)”).
8
See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 2000) (denying custody
to the former same-sex partner of a lesbian mother because it would be too
disruptive for the family, but granting visitation rights instead); E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999) (granting a former lesbian same-sex
partner visitation rights after the couple separated); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.,
533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (denying custody to the former same sex
partner and remanding the issue of visitation rights to determine if it was in the
best interest of the child).
9
See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV.
341, 344 (2002) (arguing that the current statutory framework for recognizing
lesbian second-parent adoption is too complicated and actually only ends up
hurting the child and the relationship that child has with her parents). The
adoption process is complicated, both legally and emotionally, because it is a
lengthy course involving fulfillment of many statutory requirements and is
taxing on family relationships. See infra Part I.A-B (discussing the history and
implications of adoption law on families in Pennsylvania). Common issues
faced by newly forming adoptive families include attachment, family
reorganization and resolution of differences in sexuality, gender, class and race.
Gay and lesbian adoptive families face these issues and additionally must
contend with being part of a sexual minority in an often unsympathetic,
heterosexually dominant society. See Steven E. James, Clinical Themes in Gayand Lesbian-Parented Adoptive Families, CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHIATRY 475, 480 (2002) (arguing that adoption by gay and lesbians
deserves particular attention by the mental health community because of the
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example, there is no statutory or common law prohibition against
gays and lesbians adopting a child who has no legal parents.10 On
the other hand same-sex couples that attempt to adopt in
Pennsylvania are often thwarted because of a statutory provision
requiring a biological or original adoptive parent to terminate his
parental rights prior to approval of an adoption petition filed by his
partner.11 It seems unreasonable to allow same-sex couples to
adopt a child with no legal parents without difficulty but prohibit
or set hurdles for those same couples adopting the biological child
of their same-sex partner.
On August 20, 2002, however, in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and
R.C.G.,12 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that unmarried
same-sex partners may adopt a child without meeting the statutory
requirement that the legal parent first relinquish his parental
rights.13 This groundbreaking decision was hailed as a “win for
gays and lesbians across the commonwealth.”14 The Court held
that trial courts have discretion to find cause to waive the statutory
relinquishment requirement.15 The court remanded the
unique psychological issues it raises for all involved).
10
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312 (1981) (stating “any individual may
become an adopting parent”).
11
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (West 2001) (“Unless the court for
cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless
the natural parent or parents’ rights have been terminated . . . .”). There is a
spousal exception. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2903 (West 2001)
(“Whenever a parent consents to the adoption of his child by his spouse, the
parent-child relationship between him and his child shall remain whether or not
he is one of the petitioners in the adoption proceeding.”).
12
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002).
13
Id.
14
Lori Litchman, Pennsylvania High Court Oks Second-Parent Adoption,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 21, 2002, at B-1 (reporting on the beneficial
impact of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision for gay and lesbian
couples in Pennsylvania who are raising children).
15
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1197 (finding that the
statute “affords the trial court discretion to determine whether, under the
circumstances of a particular case, cause has been shown to demonstrate why a
particular statutory requirement has not been met”). See 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2901 (West 2001) (“Unless the court for cause shown determines
otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or
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consolidated cases to the trial level to determine if cause had been
shown to waive the relinquishment requirement.16 On remand, the
petitioners in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.G. will have to
argue that cause exists to waive the relinquishment requirement
because the child is already being raised by the same-sex couple
and it would be in the best interest of the child to be legally related
to both of her parents.17
This note supports the outcome in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and
R.C.G.,18 but disagrees with the court’s reasoning, which fails to
effectuate the purpose of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act—to
ensure the welfare of the child.19 This note suggests that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court should have taken the extra step of
setting a clear standard for the trial courts to use upon remand and
in future cases. This note also suggests that the Pennsylvania
legislature should take proactive measures to protect the best
interest of children by recognizing second-parent adoptions.20
parents’ rights have been terminated . . . .”). Prior to 1982, the section read:
“Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption
shall be entered unless the adoptee has resided with the petitioner for at least six
months prior thereto or, in lieu of such residence, the adoptee is at least 18 years
of age or is related by blood or marriage to the petitioner.” See 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2901 (West 1981).
16
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1195.
17
LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opens Door to
Second-Parent Adoption, Sept. 2002 (reporting on the decision of in In re
Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.). When a same-sex partner seeks to adopt the
biological or adopted child of his partner, he is seeking formal parental rights
protecting his interests in the child in case of possible custody disputes should
the partnership dissolve. He is seeking to be a second-parent. In addition,
adoption protects the child by declaring legal parents responsible for her wellbeing and providing formal rights to inheritance and social security benefits
should her legal parents die. See Symposium, Re-Orienting Law and Sexuality:
Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Couples in Ohio: Unsettled and
Unsettling Law, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 101, 116 (2000) [hereinafter Becker]
(arguing for recognition of second-parent adoption in order to give families
stability).
18
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1195.
19
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2724 (a)-(b) (West 2001). See language of
the statute supra note 5.
20
AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (stating in second-
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Part I of this note examines the development of adoption laws
and second-parent adoption in Pennsylvania. Part II analyzes the
factual and procedural history of R.B.F. Part III discusses the
implications of R.B.F., critiques the vague standards given by the
court and suggests clearer standards for use by the trial court on
remand and in future proceedings. Part IV argues that the
legislature should take affirmative action to protect the best interest
of children of same sex couples by approving second-parent
adoption.
I. OVERVIEW OF ADOPTION LAW AND HISTORY OF SECONDPARENT ADOPTIONS
Adoption is a statutory right, unknown at common law.21
Although Congress has influence over the construction of adoption
laws, adoption is generally a question reserved for state
regulation.22 This section examines the development and purpose
parent adoption, “children born or adopted into families headed by partners who
are of the same-sex usually have only [one] biologic or adoptive legal parent.
The other partner in a parental role is called the “coparent” or “second-parent”).
See also Becker, supra note 17, at 115 (supporting recognition of second-parent
adoption); Jacobs, supra note 9, at 343 (proposing that the courts use a
“statutory parental analytic framework, the UPA, to adjudicate maternity for
lesbian coparents, thereby conferring all the rights and privileges of legal
parenthood” and thus fully protecting the relationship between a child and her
lesbian coparent).
21
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (West 2001) (“The court of
common pleas of each county shall exercise through the appropriate division
original jurisdiction over voluntary relinquishment, involuntary termination and
adoption proceedings.”).
22
GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ADOPTION:
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND CHILDREN’S INTERESTS, 30 (1994). Stevens explains
that:
At the time the Constitution was adopted, its framers felt that states
should have jurisdiction over most domestic family law questions.
Article I § 8 of the Constitution, the so-called enumerated powers
clause, limits congressional authority to act by specifying general
subject categories where federal action is permissible. Under this clause
and the Tenth Amendment, categories other than those enumerated are
reserved for state action. These enumerated powers do not readily
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of adoption laws in Pennsylvania and the current process for
adopting a child. This section will also analyze how statutory
requirements have affected the development of second-parent
adoption.
A. Statutory Adoption in Pennsylvania
In 1925, the Pennsylvania legislature codified adoption,
thereby authorizing and defining the procedural parameters of
adoption.23 The law generally sanctioned adoption to provide a
legal heir to families without male offspring and offered a
permanent family to children whose biological parents could not or
would not raise them.24
For much of the twentieth century, the adoption process was so
guarded it created the illusion that an adopted child was actually
the adoptive parents’ biological child.25 Birth parents rarely met
adoptive parents, the facts of the adoption were hidden from public
view and often the adopted child was not even informed the she
was adopted.26 Historically, the law reflected this societal attitude
by requiring the sealing of adoption records and making it difficult
for adoptees to obtain information about their birth parents.27 The
secretiveness of the process began to be questioned as parents
started to adopt children from foreign countries, adoptive parents

encompass most family law questions, so what federal legislation there
is in this area is usually based on some other federal interest, such as
conditions on federal grants. Thus, Congress has little express authority
to legislate in this area, and the individual states have the primary
authority.
Id. at 6. See also Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (holding that
state laws govern the area of domestic relations except in rare occasions when
family law comes into conflict with a federal statute).
23
127 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1 (West 1925).
24
See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM ET. AL., THE RIGHTS OF FAMILIES 204 (1996)
(discussing the procedure and implication of adoption law).
25
See id. at 203 (discussing the social policy reasons for keeping adoptions
secret including shame).
26
Id.
27
Id.
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increasingly informed their children about their adoption at
younger ages, and meetings between birth parents and adoptive
parents became routine.28
As social policy shifted during the century, the statutes were
amended numerous times.29 These amendments were also
propagated to codify the court’s interpretation of the laws.30 In
1970, in response to society’s changing attitude towards adoption
as something more acceptable, the Pennsylvania legislature passed
the Adoption Act, replacing the earlier adoption statutes.31 The
Adoption Act defines who may adopt, who may be adopted, and
sets forth the requirements for the contents of an adoption
petition.32 While adoption law has developed in many ways, the

28

Id.
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102 (West 2001) (listing the 1947,
1970, 1981 and 1982 amendments to the Adoption Act).
30
Symposium, Constructing Family, Constructing Change: Shifting Legal
Perspectives on Same-Sex Relationships: Panel One: Family Law: Article:
Binding the Family Ties: A Child Advocacy Perspective on Second-Parent
Adoptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 270 (Spring 1998)
[hereinafter Glennon] (arguing that the judge’s practice of allowing step-parents
to adopt forced the legislature to codify adoption in 1970). Other reasons for the
amendments include clarification of the laws as well as streamlining of adoption
procedure to make it simpler and faster. Id.
31
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101-2910 (West 2003); JOINT STATE
GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, Proposed Adoption Act, Leg. J., 182 (Pa. 1970)
(the Act was passed but with modest legislative history). See Adoption of
C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); Adoption of R.B.F. and
R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 741 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that the Adoption Act of 1970, July 24, P.L. 620, No. 208 § 601(a)
states that “the act of April 4, 1925 (P.L.127), entitled ‘An act relating to
Adoption,’ is hereby repealed absolutely”).
32
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312 (West 2001) (“Any individual may
become an adopting parent.”); § 2311 (“Any individual may be adopted,
regardless of his age or residence.”); § 2710 (The petition requirements include
information about the adopting parent such as name, residence, marital status,
age occupation, religious affiliation, racial background and their relationship to
the adoptee.). Also, the petition must include copies of all section 2711 consents
required by the Adoption Act relating to consents necessary to adoption or the
basis upon which such consents are not required. See § 2710. Finally, a copy of
the adoptee’s birth certificate must be included. See id.
29
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system still reflects the traditional view of adoption as a secret
process,33 in that petitions and hearings remain closed to the public
and obtaining access to adoption records remains a challenge.34
Modern adoption law creates the process by which a parentchild relationship is legally formed between a child and an adult
who is not the child’s biological parent.35 Following an adoption,
the birth parent relinquishes and the adoptive parent assumes all of
the biological parent’s rights and responsibilities.36 There are
exceptional circumstances, such as stepparent adoptions, where a
judicial decree will not end the legal relationship between a child
and the members of her biological family.37 Only the courts may
order adoption, and a prospective adoptive parent must seek the
court’s permission to adopt by filing a petition. 38 After the petition
is filed, the court orders an investigation and report to be filed,
which helps determine the child’s eligibility for adoption and the

33

See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 203 (explaining that the child is
usually left unaware of the adoption in order to “shield the birth mother from the
stigma of having given birth to a child out-of-wedlock and to mask the adoptive
parents’ inability to conceive a child”).
34
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504.1 (2003). The statute states in pertinent
part:
The court shall take such steps as are reasonably necessary to assure
that the identity of the adoptive parent or parents is not disclosed
without their consent in any proceeding under this subchapter or
Subchapter B (relating to involuntary termination). The Supreme Court
may prescribe uniform rules under this section relating to such
confidentiality.
Id. For a discussion on adoption proceedings and the confidentiality of the
various records, see LESTER WALLMAN & LAWRENCE J. SCHWARZ, HANDBOOK
OF FAMILY LAW 78 (1989) (discussing adoption proceedings and the
confidentiality of the various records).
35
See WALLMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 34, at 77 (detailing the legal
process of adoption).
36
Id. at 108 (discussing the legal effects of adoption).
37
Id. at 107.
38
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (West 2001) (“The court of
common pleas of each county shall exercise through the appropriate division
original jurisdiction over voluntary relinquishment, involuntary termination and
adoption proceedings.”).
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suitability of the placement.39 After evaluating the child’s best
interest, the judge decides whether to approve the adoption.40 The
judge makes her decision after examining the petition for adoption,
obtaining all necessary consents and conducting a hearing.41
39

23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2525 (West 2001) (The statute states in
pertinent part:
The court shall cause an investigation to be made and a report filed
by . . . an appropriate person designated by the court . . . . The
investigation shall cover all pertinent information regarding the child’s
eligibility for adoption and the suitability of the placement, including
the physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the child, and
the child’s and the adopting parent’s age, sex, health and racial, ethnic
and religious background.
Id.
40
In re McQuinton’s Adoption, 86 A. 205, 269 (Pa. 1913) (finding that the
Adoption Act required the court to decree adoption liberally because it gave
children greater opportunities for the fullest development).
The general purpose of the act in question is unmistakable; it is the
expression of the humane and benevolent sentiments of the legislature
that passed it towards a dependent class of our population, many
members of which, by reason of conditions for which they are not
responsible, and which, because of infancy they have no power to
overcome, are, if not entirely helpless in the struggle of life, so far
prejudiced and handicapped by their environment that fair opportunity
to develop into virtuous men and women is denied them. It therefore
calls for a liberal construction to the end that it may fairly accomplish
the purpose of the enactment.
Id. See also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2724 (a)-(b) (West 2001) (setting forth
factors taken into account in evaluating the child’s best interests). Section
2724(b) states that:
The court shall hear testimony in support of the petition and such
additional testimony as it deems necessary to inform it as to the
desirability of the proposed adoption . . . . In any case, the age, sex,
health, social and economic status or racial, ethnic or religious
background of the child or adopting parents shall not preclude an
adoption but the court shall decide its desirability on the basis of the
physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
Id. (emphasis added).
41
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2724 (West 2001) (stating that at the hearing,
testimony can be given in support of the petition and an investigation can be
ordered to verify the statements of the petition or other facts to determine the
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Therefore case law provides guidance in areas that the legislature
has not yet acted, such as the articulation of desirable and
undesirable adoptive situations.42
B. Development of Second-Parent Adoption
In order to promote finality in adoption proceedings, most state
laws include a cut-off provision prohibiting adoption by an
unmarried partner unless the parental rights of the first parent are
terminated.43 This provision allows the new family to develop
without fear of intrusion from the biological parents.44 There is a
desirability of the adoption); see also WALLMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 34, at
78 (stating that the adoption will be approved when the court has reviewed the
results of the hearing, all legal requirements have been met and the court finds it
is in the best interest of the child).
42
See, e.g., Adoption of E.M.A., 409 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1979) (holding that a
parent’s qualified consent to an adoption of his child by another who is not his
spouse is not permissible under the law).
43
See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(a) (McKinney 1999) (“After the
making of an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child . . . shall
have no rights over such adoptive child or his property by descent or
succession.”); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 210, § 6 (West 1999) (“All rights,
duties and other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parent
shall . . . terminate between the child so adopted and his natural parents and
kindred.”); See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2903 (West 2000) (“Whenever a
parent consents to the adoption of his child by his spouse, the parent-child
relationship between him and his child shall remain whether or not he is one of
the petitioners in the adoption proceeding.”) Wisconsin has a similar provision.
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.92(2) (2001) (“After the order of adoption is entered
the relationship of parent and child between the adopted person and the adopted
person’s birth parents, unless the birth parent is the spouse of the adoptive
parent, shall be completely altered and all the rights, duties and other legal
consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist.”).
44
See Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts,
Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 937
(2000) (arguing that adoption is traditionally seen as a process where one family
ends and a new one begins); see also WALLMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 34, at
108. Wallman and Schwarz explain the legal effect of adoption:
An order of adoption terminates any rights the natural parents
previously had with respect to the child and vice versa. Through the
adoption process a new lineage results and a child possesses the same
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statutory exception to the cut-off provision for stepparents, which
allows the spouse of a birth parent or of an adoptive parent to
adopt the child without terminating any initial parental rights.45
The rationale behind the stepparent exception derives from the
custodial biological parent’s plan to raise the child with the
stepparent.46 This is because the government believes that if the
non-custodial biological parent approves of the adoption or is no
longer a part of the child’s life there will be no animosity among
the parties to disrupt finality, and it will be in the best interest of
the child to have this additional step-parent adopt her.47
The statutory section, however, does not apply to same-sex
couples because under Pennsylvania law, same-sex couples are not
permitted to marry.48 Thus if the custodial legal parent desires his
same-sex partner to possess the legal status of parent, he cannot
achieve this without superseding his own parental rights.49 This
status he would have had if he was born to the adoptive parents. For
example, once adopted, the child has the right to be supported by the
adoptive parents and the right to inherit from and through them.
Id.
45

23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2903 (West 2000) (“Whenever a parent
consents to the adoption of his child by his spouse, the parent-child relationship
between him and his child shall remain whether or not he is one of the
petitioners in the adoption proceeding.”). Wisconsin has a similar provision. See
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.92(2) (2001) (“After the order of adoption is entered the
relationship of parent and child between the adopted person and the adopted
person’s birth parents, unless the birth parent is the spouse of the adoptive
parent, shall be completely altered and all the rights, duties and other legal
consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist.”); see also Schacter, supra
note 44, at 937 (“State adoption statutes generally recognize an exception to this
cut-off provision for stepparent adoptions, which, by some tallies, have come to
compromise the majority of all adoptions.”).
46
See Schacter, supra note 44, at 937.
47
See Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions:
On Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of The Child,
66 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (1999) (discussing the different types of adoption).
48
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2000) (“Marriage shall be
between one man and one woman . . . [and] a marriage between persons of the
same-sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if
valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.”).
49
When a lesbian woman or gay man becomes a parent through adoption
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statutory cut-off provision is problematic for same-sex couples
trying to adopt. The child’s legal parent does not wish to relinquish
his parental rights, yet he cannot fall under the spousal exception,
which would allow both parents to possess legal rights.50
Not all courts apply cut-off provisions to forbid same-sex
adoptions. In Vermont, for instance, the Supreme Court permitted
adoption by a lesbian couple without requiring termination of the
biological mother’s rights, finding that adoption is in the best
interest of the children when the partner has been living with the
biological mother since the children’s births and the wording of the
statute does not expressly prohibit such an adoption.51 Similarly, in
Massachusetts, the Supreme Court permitted a lesbian parent’s
same-sex partner to adopt the parent’s biological child.52 The Court
found it would be in the best interest of the child because the
women had a stable and committed relationship, both women

or alternative insemination, the law acknowledges that person as having full and
absolute parental rights. See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at
1 (explaining the process of alternative insemination); see In the Matter of the
Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (granting
the adoption of a child by its biological mother’s lesbian partner); The lesbian or
gay parent’s partner may function as a second-parent, but he or she may not
have any formal legal rights with respect to the child; see, e.g., In re Adoption of
B.L.P., 16 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 95, 98 (Montg. Co. Orphans’ Ct. Pa. 1998) (rejecting
the application of a lesbian partner to become an adoptive parent of a child); see
also Schacter, supra note 44, at 936 (stating that “there is a disturbing
asymmetry between the profound emotional bonds that may link a child to a
non-biological parent and the law, which, in the absence of second-parent
adoption, is likely to treat that parent as a “legal stranger” to the child).
50
See, e.g., Georgina G. v. Terry M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994)
(holding that an adoption of the child by the biological mother’s same-sex
partner would sever the biological mother’s ties with the child). The court also
found that the legislature specifically exempted stepparent adoptions from
cutting off parental rights, and therefore the court presumed that the legislature
did not intend to exempt adoptions by non-marital partners, concluding that the
cut-off provision was mandatory for non-marital partners. Id.
51
Adoptions of B.L.V.B, 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); 15 VT. STAT. ANN.
§301 (West 2002) (stating “legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations of
parents [are] to be established for benefit of children”); 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 665
(stating custody to be awarded upon the best interests of child).
52
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).
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participated jointly in raising the child, the child viewed both
women as parents, and the child would gain the practical benefits
from the legal recognition of a second-parent.53 The highest courts
of New York and the District of Columbia have also approved the
adoption of children by their parents’ same-sex partners.54 In
addition, lower courts in a number of other states have all approved
second-parent adoption by same-sex couples.55
Courts that have permitted such adoptions generally conclude
that children are best served by having two legal parents rather
than one legal parent and one de facto parent.56 A child with two
legal parents has two sources of support and inheritance rights, as
well as access to an array of benefits, including health insurance,
social security and other benefits provided by the parents’
53

Id; MA. STAT. 210 §1 (West 2002) (“A person of full age may petition
the probate court in the county where he resides for leave to adopt as his child
another person younger than himself . . . (iii) the granting of the petition is in the
best interests of the child.”). Practical benefits include the child gaining access
to the second-parents health insurance coverage and additional inheritance
benefits. Id.
54
See, e.g., In re Dana, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that
provision of adoption statute terminating biological parent’s rights toward
adoptive child does not apply in situations when biological parent consents to
adoption, agrees to retain parental rights, and agrees to raise child together with
adopting parent). The court did not require the termination of the parental rights
of biological mothers who consented to adoption of their respective children by
an unmarried man and lesbian partner with whom the mothers shared long-term
emotional and financial commitments. See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 117(1)(a) (“After
the making of an order of adoption the birth parents of the adoptive child shall
be relieved of all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall
have no rights over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or
succession, except as hereinafter stated.”); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C.
1995) (holding that gay and lesbian partners have standing under New York and
Washington D.C. law to become adoptive parents, and the portions of the
statutes purporting to terminate the biological mothers’ parental rights do not
apply).
55
See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 285 (discussing the current status of
second-parent adoption law in various states).
56
See Jacobs, supra note 9, at 346 (reporting on cases where courts have
sanctioned second-parent adoption because of the benefits to the child). An
individual becomes a de facto parent when they have assisted in the raising of a
child to such a degree that it as if they are actually the child’s parent). Id.
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employers.57 If the adults’ relationship later ends, their status as the
child’s legal parents gives them both standing to seek custody or
visitation with the child.58 Additionally, both legal parents could be
required to continue to support the child.59
With adoption law currently in a state of flux because each
state has different laws, the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved a
new Uniform Adoption Act in 1994, which has been forwarded to
all fifty states with a recommendation that it be enacted by their
legislatures.60 This model law seeks to promote the interest of
children in being raised by parents, including same-sex couples,
who are committed and capable of caring for them.61 The model
law departs from the historical practice of categorically excluding
whole classes of prospective adoptive parents on the basis of
marital status, sexual orientation or other arbitrary factors, and
seeks to protect children’s ties to the people who have actually
raised them.62
57

Id.
See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 229.
59
See L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (finding that a
lesbian that has the status of in loco parentis to the biological child of her former
partner must pay child support).
60
Unif. Adoption Act 2-401-09, 9 U.L.A. (1994). The prefatory note of the
Act states:
The Act aims to be a comprehensive and uniform state adoption code
that: (1) is consistent with relevant federal constitutional and statutory
law; (2) delineates the legal requirements and consequences of different
kinds of adoption; (3) promotes the integrity and finality of adoptions
while discouraging “trafficking” in minors; (4) respects the choices
made by the parties to an adoption about how much confidentiality or
openness they prefer in their relations with each other, subject,
however, to judicial protection of the adoptee’s welfare; and (5)
promotes the interest of minor children in being raised by individuals
who are committed to, and capable of, caring for them.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. (stating that the NCCUSL wants to “encourage different kinds of
people to adopt and prohibit the categorical exclusion of anyone from being
considered as an adoptive parent”).
58
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In addition the American Academy of Pediatrics recently
published a study on the benefits of second-parent adoption.63 The
study found that legal endorsement of second-parent adoption
achieves greater custodial rights and responsibilities for the
adoptive parent protecting the child if the biological or original
adoptive parent becomes unable to take care of the child or the
couple separates.64 Legal endorsement also ensures the child’s
eligibility for health benefits, inheritance and social security
survivor benefits from both parents, and provides legal grounds for
either parent to offer their consent for medical care, or make
educational and other important decisions on behalf of the child.65
The American Academy of Pediatrics therefore supports legislative
and legal efforts to permit adoption of the child by the secondparent in gay and lesbian families.66
The recommendations proposed neither by NCCUSL nor by
the American Academy of Pediatrics have been implemented in

63

See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4. The study
evaluated evidence, gathered during several decades using diverse samples and
methodologies, of the impact of gay or lesbian parents on children, and
concluded that a child’s development will improve if the relationship of their
homosexual parents is recognized by law because there will likely be less
conflict and more stability in the home. Id.
64
See L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 874 (finding that a lesbian that has the
status of in loco parentis to the biological child of her former partner must pay
child support); see, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 9, at 344 (discussing the implication
of Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App.1991)). In this case a
lesbian couple planned to have a child together, and then one of the women
conceived and had the child. Id. at 219. Later the biological mother was killed in
a car accident and the court found the women who did not give birth to the child
was not a parent and thus could not have custody to the child, despite the
planning and caring for the child. Id.
65
AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. See, e.g., Jacobs,
supra note 9, at 347 (discussing the benefits of recognizing second-parent
adoptions).
66
AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (finding that when
two adults raise a child, they and the child deserve the security that comes along
with legal recognition because denying proper parental legal status prevents
“children from enjoying the psychologic[al] and legal security that comes from
having 2 willing, capable, and loving parents”).
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Pennsylvania.67 There is, however, no statutory or common law
prohibition against gays and lesbians or unmarried couples
adopting in Pennsylvania.68 Instead, couples are required to
demonstrate why the adoption is desirable, and judicial
determinations are made on a case-by-case basis.69
Judicially approved adoptions, which require the court to create
an exception to the Adoption Act, were not available in
Pennsylvania until the decision in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and
R.C.G.70 For example, in In re Adoption of E.M.A, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the father’s qualified
consent (consenting to adoption without fully relinquishing
parental rights, as seen in stepparent adoption) was not sufficient to
meet the statutory requirement when a non-spouse sought to
adopt.71 The court stated that, “our courts have no authority to
67

See Glennon, supra note 30, at 265, 276 (stating that the Pennsylvania
Adoption Act has some similar wording to the model law but the model law
remains unadopted. Glennon also argues that the recommendations of social
scientists such as the American Academy of Pediatrics are not followed).
68
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. 2002).
One state expressly prohibits gays and lesbians from adopting. FLA. STAT. CH.
63.042(3) (1999) (providing that “no person eligible to adopt under this statute
may adopt if that person is a homosexual”).
69
Id. at 1202. In states that do not expressly prohibit gays and lesbians
from adopting, the judicial system determines whether the second-parent
receives legal rights with respect to the adopted child. Adoption of R.B.F. and
R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(stating “[o]ur legislature . . . has already recognized that the trial judges who
are on the front lines of these adoption proceeding are best situated to determine
an appropriate procedure to follow in cases where there is a void of authority in
the Adoption Act.” See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 2000)
(denying custody to the former same-sex partner of a lesbian mother because it
would be to disruptive for the family but granting visitation rights); E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999) (granting a former lesbian same-sex
partner visitation rights after the couple separated); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.,
533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (denying custody to the former same sex
partner and remanding the issue of visitation rights to determine if it was in the
best interest of the child).
70
In re Adoption of E.M.A., 409 A.2d 10, 11 (Pa. 1979).
71
Id. Qualified consent means sanctioning the action without relinquishing
your own rights which is required to effectuate the adoption petition. Id.
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decree an adoption in the absence of the statutorily required
consents. Nor may exceptions to the Adoption Act be judicially
created where the Legislature did not see fit to create them.”72 The
court’s language made same-sex couples wary of their chances of
success in adoption proceedings in Pennsylvania.73 Even with such
strong language, fourteen county courts in Pennsylvania allowed
for second-parent adoption.74 In November 2000, second-parent
adoptions in Pennsylvania were suspended pending appeal of In re
Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and
R.C.F., Pennsylvania state cases in which two gay couples’
adoption petitions were rejected.75 This fractured societal
framework, including the complex statutory conditions, formed the
background in which R.B.F. was litigated.
II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF R.B.F. ET AL.
The decision in In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.G.76
consolidates two cases on appeal: In re Adoption of C.C.G. and
Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.77 This decision
confirms that same-sex adoption is possible under current
Pennsylvania law.78
72

Id. at 11.
See Glennon, supra note 30, at 277 (arguing that same-sex couple
adoption precedent hurts the chances that these “families” will attempt to
become legal through adoption proceedings).
74
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 740 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000); see also Ruling Benefits Gays’ Children: Health Coverage, Inheritance,
Social Security Rights Widened, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 22, 2002, at
B-1 (discussing the various approaches county courts in Pennsylvania took to
second-parent adoption).
75
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 740; In re Adoption of
C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 727-28. (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
76
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002).
77
Id. at 1199.
78
Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, did not answer other
legal questions implicated by same-sex adoption, such as whether the
constitutional concept of equal protection requires that adoption petitions of
same-sex couples be granted. See Glennon, supra note 30, at 260 (discussing
other arguments that gay couples may have to defend their adoption petitions
73
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A. In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G.
In In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., the appellants, J.C.G.
and J.J.G., have been gay domestic partners in Pennsylvania since
1982.79 In 1991, J.J.G. legally adopted C.C.G., and in 1999, J.J.G.
legally adopted his second child, Z.C.G.80 After the adoptions, the
children and the appellants lived together as a family.81 In June of
1998, J.C.G., the gay partner and prospective adopting parent,
legally changed his last name to that of J.J.G., the legal parent.82 In
May of 1999, appellants, J.J.G. and J.C.G. filed a petition pursuant
to the Adoption Act wherein the gay partner sought to adopt the
children.83 The petition was required by statute to contain a
consent form relinquishing the parental rights of J.J.G. 84 The
appellants intentionally omitted the language indicating permanent
surrender of J.J.G.’s parental rights.85
On June 18, 1999, the Erie County Common Pleas Court issued
an order denying the adoption petition because the father failed to
relinquish his parental rights as required under section 2711(d) of
being denied). This note, however, will focus on the procedural process of
R.B.F. to develop a better understanding of how and why the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held as it did.
79
Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 726 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 730.
82
Id. at 726. See text accompanying note 48 (discussing inability of gay
partners to legally marry).
83
Id.
84
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(D)(1) (West 2002) (requiring the
consenting parent of an adoptee under the age of eighteen to provide a statement
relinquishing parental rights to his child). The statute states in pertinent part:
I hereby voluntarily and unconditionally consent to the adoption of the
above named child. I understand that by signing this consent I indicate
my intent to permanently give up all rights to this child. I understand
such child will be placed for adoption . . . . I have read and understand
the above and I am signing it as a free and voluntary act.
Id.
85
In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 727-28. (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2000).
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Pennsylvania law.86 Appellants filed a motion requesting the trial
court withdraw its order.87 On June 19, 1999, the trial court
affirmed its order and Appellants filed an appeal.88 On June 19,
2000 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the denial of the
adoption petition.89
B. In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.
In In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., the appellants, C.H.F.
and B.A.F., are a lesbian couple who have been domestic partners
in Pennsylvania since 1983.90 In 1996, after deciding to raise a
family together, C.H.F. conceived through in vitro fertilization
with an anonymous donor.91 B.A.F. legally changed her last name
to that of appellant C.H.F. before the twins were born on March
11, 1997.92 On April 24, 1998, appellants filed a petition with the
Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County seeking adoption of
the children by B.A.F.93 Similar to the companion case of In re
Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G.,94 appellant C.H.F. intentionally
omitted statutorily required language from the petition
permanently relinquishing her parental rights.95
On October 22, 1998, the trial court denied the petition based
on the appellants’ failure to meet the requirements of the Adoption

86

See id. at 726; § 2711(D)(1) (“The consenting parent of an adoptee under
the age of eighteen must provide a statement relinquishing parental rights to his
child.”).
87
See In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 726.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 730. The denial of the adoption petition was affirmed for lacking
the parental relinquishment required by statute. Id.
90
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1198-99 (Pa.
2002).
91
Id.
92
Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000);
In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 727-28 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000).
93
Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 740.
94
Id.
95
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1198.
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Act by omitting the parental rights relinquishment language.96 The
appellants appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the trial
court’s judgment.97 The appellants then filed a motion for
reargument and reconsideration, which was granted.98 The court
nonetheless affirmed the denial of the petition on June 19, 2000,
the same day as the petition in In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G.
was denied.99 The Superior Court issued almost identical opinions
for In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of
R.B.F. and R.C.F.100
1. Superior Court Majority Opinion from In re Adoption of
C.C.G. and Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.101
The majority, noting the appellants’ purposeful omissions of
the relinquishment requirement from their petitions for adoptions,
held that the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Adoption
Act do not permit a non-spouse to adopt a child where the legal
parents have not relinquished their respective parental rights.102
The court refused to create judicial exceptions to the requirements
of the Adoption Act, stating that to do so would overstep into the
authority of the legislature.103 The Superior Court therefore
rejected the appellants’ claim that the trial court was afforded
discretion to waive statutory requirements when “cause had been
shown,” finding instead that the statutory requirements had not
been met, and no cause had been shown why they should not be
96

Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 739.
Id.
98
Id. at 740.
99
Id. at 742; In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 726 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000).
100
In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 726; In re Adoption
of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 739. Because the opinions are nearly
identical, the remainder of the discussion of case history in Part II will treat the
opinions as one.
101
In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 727-28.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 728 (stating “it is for the legislature to decide whether to expand
the Adoption Act to cover same-sex partners”).
97
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met.104 Without fulfillment of the statutory requirements, the
analysis of the best interest and general welfare of the children
would be premature and therefore could not be considered.105
Consequently, the court denied the petitions.106
2.

Judge Elliot’s Concurrence in In re Adoption of C.C.G. and
Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.107

Judge Elliot, in concurrence, contended that qualified consent
is only effective in spousal situations because of the narrow
interpretation of qualified consent in the binding precedent of In re
Adoption of E.M.A.108 Since the appellants cannot be recognized as
married, they cannot fall under the spousal exception for qualified
consent.109 Judge Elliot focused on the holding from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in E.M.A., which insisted on strict
construction of the Adoption Act and lack of judicial power to
create exceptions to the Act where the legislature did not grant
them.110 Judge Elliot suggested that, in light of the precedent and
the realities of changing families petitioning for adoption, “the
issue of qualified consent outside of marriage must be re-addressed
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or returned to the Legislature
for further consideration or amendment.”111
3.

Dissenting Opinions in In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G.

104

Id. at 729. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(2002) (requiring the
consenting parent of an adoptee under the age of eighteen to provide a statement
relinquishing parental rights to his child unless cause can be shown as to why
such parental rights should not be relinquished).
105
In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 734.
106
Id. at 733.
107
Id. at 730.
108
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000); In re Adoption of E.M.A., 409 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1979) (holding that a
parent’s qualified consent to an adoption of his child by another who is not his
spouse is not permissible under the law).
109
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 744.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 744-45.
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and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F.112
a. Judge Johnson
Judge Johnson’s dissenting opinion articulated three reasons
for dissenting from the majority opinion.113 First, Judge Johnson
argued that section 2711 of the Adoption Act,114 requiring the
relinquishment of parental rights, should not be strictly construed
because it “contravenes the mandate of the Statutory Construction
Act to liberally construe state statutes,115 and is incongruous with
the legislature’s purpose in enacting section 2711.”116 Judge
Johnson articulated that the portion of section 2771 requiring
voluntary relinquishment of parental rights served the limited
purposes of protecting a parent’s fundamental liberty interest117
and ensuring finality by preventing the biological parent from
challenging the adoption.118 Judge Johnson argued that neither of
those purposes was served because J.J.G.’s relinquishment of his
parental rights contravened the protection of his fundamental

112

Id. at 745.
Id. Judges Kelly and Todd joined Judge Johnson’s dissent. Id.
114
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711 (West 2001) (“The consenting parent
of an adoptee under the age of eighteen must provide a statement relinquishing
parental rights to his child.”).
115
See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1501-1991; In re Adoption of R.B.F. and
R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 741 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); see also 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1928(a) (stating the “rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed, shall have no application to the statutes of this
Commonwealth enacted finally after September 1, 1937”). Because the
Adoption Act was enacted in 1970, the Act must be liberally construed. Id.; see
also 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1928(c) (stating that “all other provisions of a statute
shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and promote justice”).
116
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 741 (noting that the
purpose of the Adoption Act is to promote the child’s best interest).
117
Id. at 746 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
118
Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 731 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000) (citing In the Matter of Adoption of Christopher P., 389 A.2d 94, 97 (Pa.
1978); In re Shapiro, 377 A.2d 153, 155 (Pa. 1977)).
113
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liberty interest.119 In addition, J.J.G. was a party to the petition for
adoption and the only person possessing legal rights to the
children.120 Therefore, no finality issue existed because J.J.G.
would not challenge the adoption later since he was a voluntary
party to the petition from its inception. 121
Second, Judge Johnson stated that the majority erroneously
relied on cases involving involuntary termination of parental
rights, while this case involved retention of parental rights.122
Judge Johnson argued that in failing to make the distinction, the
majority overlooked the trial court’s discretion in granting
adoption petitions pursuant to section 2901 of the Adoption Act.123
He stated that the “cause shown” language in section 2901 allows
the court to determine that an adoption should be granted, and the
court may do so even though a parent’s rights have not been
terminated.124 He argued that the majority’s reading of the
termination clause, which would restrict the trial court from
considering reasons why the adoption should be granted without
meeting the termination provisions, effectively eliminates the
“cause shown” language, rendering the clause superfluous.125
119

In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 732 (asserting that
J.J.G.’s fundamental liberty interest is his maintaining his parental rights). Id.
120
Id. at 726.
121
Id.
122
J.J.G. never intended to relinquish his parental rights and was only
seeking to extend parental rights to his partner J.C.G. In re Adoption of C.C.G.
and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 728. The case in which Judge Johnson believed the
majority erroneously relied on is In re Adoption of E.M.A. 409 A.2d. 10 (Pa.
1979), discussed supra note 108.
123
In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 733-34 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2000); see also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (West 2001) (stating in
pertinent part that “[u]nless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no
decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or parents’ rights
have been terminated . . . and all other legal requirements have been met”).
124
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 746 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000).
125
Id. at 747 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mack Bros. Motor Car Co., 59
A.2d 923, 925 (Pa. 1948) and Commonwealth v. Baumer A.2d 472, 474 (Pa.
Super. 1968) and citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §1922(2) (stating that the General
Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain)). It states “The

LIEBERMAN2.DOC

3/3/2004 1:49 PM

SAME SEX ADOPTION IN THE KEYSTONE STATE

311

Johnson concluded that where petitioners are seeking to add a
parent, and no fundamental parental rights are at risk, section
2901’s “cause shown language” gives the court discretion to
dispense with the parental termination requirement of section
2711.126 He articulated that in cases where no fundamental parental
rights are at risk, the court’s examination should focus on the
child’s best interest rather than the termination of parental rights.127
Third, Judge Johnson stated that the majority’s focus should
not have been on the homosexual relationships between the
petitioners, but on the parent-child relationship and the benefits
that adoption would offer the children.128 He argued that the
majority’s failure to recognize the reality of gay and lesbian
couples raising children “perpetuates the fiction of family
homogeneity at the expense of the children whose reality does not
fit this form.”129 He noted that while the children’s daily lives
would not be altered by the denial of the petition, they would have
less legal protection available.130 For those reasons, Johnson
concluded that the majority of the court was incorrect in denying
the adoption and should have used it’s discretion to decree the
adoption on the basis of the best interests of the child.131
b. Judge Todd
Judges Kelly and Johnson joined Judge Todd’s dissenting

legislature cannot, however be deemed to intend that language used in a statute
shall be superfluous and without import.” Id.
126
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 742.
127
Id. at 748.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 744.
130
Id. at 748 (stating that the child will have less legal protection because
they will not be able to inherit from the denied parent or receive health benefits
from that parent’s employer).
131
Id. at 752. See also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (“Unless the court
for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered
unless the natural parent or parents’ rights have been terminated.”). This gives
trial judges discretion to decree a petition for adoption upon cause shown as to
why the statutory requirements need not be met. Id.
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opinion which focused heavily on the child/parent relationships
that were already established and deserved legal recognition in
these cases.132 Judge Todd emphasized the impact of the majority’s
decision on the children involved and argued that second-parent
adoption was consistent with Pennsylvania law based on the trial
court’s discretion to decree these adoptions pursuant to section
2901.133 He found that second-parent adoption advances the
welfare of the children involved because it recognizes a “real
family” where the parents have co-parented the children since birth
and are trying to provide for those children by gaining the legal
rights and benefits associated with adoption.134 These benefits
“include the legal protection of the children’s existing familial
bonds, their rights to financial support from two parents instead of
one, rights to inheritance from each parent and rights to obtain
other available dependent benefits, such as health care, insurance
and Social Security benefits, from either parent.”135 He concluded
that the majority’s failure to focus on the best interest of the child
was erroneous, and further, that the trial court abused its discretion
when it dismissed appellants’ petition for adoption without holding
a hearing to determine whether good cause had been shown to
allow the adoption.136
C. State High Court Decision
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted appeal in both
cases and consolidated the actions.137 In Adoption of R.B.F. and
132

Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 751.
Id. at 752.
134
Id. at 751.
135
Id.
136
Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000). See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2724(a) (West 2003) (stating that “the
court shall hear testimony in support of the petition and such additional
testimony as it deems necessary to inform it as to the desirability of the proposed
adoption”).
137
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002). The
actions were consolidated because they came to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court at essentially the same time and based on the similarity of facts. Id.
133
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R.C.G., the Court decided whether the Adoption Act requires a
biological or adoptive legal parent to relinquish his parental rights
in cases where a same-sex partner seeks to adopt the legal parent’s
child.138 On August 20, 2002, the Court unanimously vacated the
orders of the Superior Court and remanded the appellants’ cases to
the trial court to determine whether “cause [was] shown” for the
parental relinquishment requirements to be waived.139 While the
Court agreed with the lower court in the E.M.A. case in that the
judiciary could not read exceptions into statutes,140 the Court said
that E.M.A. was distinguishable because of an amendment to
section 2901 passed subsequent to the E.M.A. decision.141 The
Court stated:
There is no reasonable construction of the Section 2901
“cause shown” language other than to conclude that it
permits a petitioner to demonstrate why, in a particular
case, he or she cannot meet the statutory requirements.
Upon a showing of cause, the trial court is afforded
discretion to determine whether the adoption petition
should, nevertheless, be granted.142
The Court further stated that in determining “cause” under section
2901, courts must consider what is the best interest of the child
because otherwise there is no guarantee that children will be
protected.143 An evaluation of the child’s best interest could be
done prior to satisfying all of the statutory requirements.144
The Court expanded its interpretation and definition of “cause
shown” by tracking the reasoning from a prior state court decision,
In Re Long.145 In In re Long, the adoptee sought access to her
138

Id.
Id.
140
Id. at 1201.
141
Id.
142
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1201-02 (Pa.
2002) (emphasis in original).
143
Id. at 1202.
144
See id. at 1203 (stating that initially evaluating the child’s best interest
would speed the review immensely).
145
Id. (quoting In re Long, 745 A.2d 673 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)). In re Long
did not directly deal with section 2901 but did deal with “cause shown”
139
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adoption records.146 Section 2905 of the Adoption Act granted
such access if requested pursuant to an order of the court finding
cause shown.147 In interpreting In re Long, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court “described cause for disclosure as a determination,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the adoptee’s need for
adoption information clearly outweighed the considerations behind
the statute” of keeping adoption records closed.148 Therefore the
Court concluded that appellants should be given an opportunity at
an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that the component of
section 2711(d) requiring the relinquishment of parental rights is
unnecessary or is satisfied because of their individual
circumstances.149 For example, the appellants would have to show
that there would be no violation of the biological or adoptive legal
parent’s rights because that parent was voluntarily a party to the
adoption petition from inception.150
III. ANALYSIS
In deciding In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.G., the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the child’s best interest
was served by allowing the petition to go forward without
requiring the biological or adoptive legal parent to relinquish his
parental rights.151 This decision promotes the child’s best interest
because it protects the liberty interest of the legal parent while
promoting security for the child by offering her the benefits of two

language from another section of the Adoption Act. Id.
146
Id.; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 2905(a) (2002). Section 2905 provides
that all adoption records “shall be kept in the files of the court as a permanent
record thereof and withheld from inspection except on an order of court granted
upon cause shown . . . .” Id.
147
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1204 (quoting In re
Long, 745 A.2d 673 (Pa. Super. 2000); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2905(a)
(West 2000)).
148
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1204 (quoting In re
Long, 745 A.2d 673 (Pa. Super. 2000)).
149
Id. at 1205.
150
Id. at 1203.
151
Id.
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legally responsible adults.152 The child receives the legal rights and
benefits associated with adoption such as financial and health care
insurance benefits, inheritance rights to two parents’ estates, and
legal recognition of already established bonds.153 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision recognizes the reality that many nontraditional families exist and offers these de facto families the legal
protections of adoption.154
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision, however, did not
set a clear standard for when cause is shown; as a result, future
litigants are left with the uncertainty that a trial judge may still
determine that cause has not been met and deny a petition even
when the facts are similar to those in R.B.F.155 The court’s failure
to categorically hold that the parental termination clause of section
152

See Bruce D. Gill, Comment: Best Interest of the Child? A Critique of
Judicially Sanctioned Arguments Denying Child Custody to Gays and Lesbians,
68 TENN. L. REV. 361 (2001) (concluding that denying same-sex couples legal
parent status through adoption only hurts the children and is done because of
judicial bias).
153
See In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 737 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2000) (Todd, J., dissenting); In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317
(Mass. 1993) (explaining that adoption would not result in any tangible change
in the child’s daily life but would entitle her to inheritance, support, and
insurance from non-biological mother, and would grant the non biological
mother custody if the biological mother died).
154
See Glennon, supra note 30, at 282. Glennon argues that:
Adoption should depend on the demonstrated willingness and ability of
an adult to provide a child with essential caretaking and nurturing. If a
parent is willing to bring in another adult to share that burden and
privilege, and the parent fully understands the consequences of
allowing another adult to create a legal parent-child relationship with
that child, the state should not refuse an adoption because of concerns
about the legal status of the relationship between the adults.
Id.
155
See Michael T. Morley, Richard Albert, Jennie L. Kneedler &
Chrystiane Pereira, Developments in Law and Policy: Emerging Issues in
Family Law, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 199 (2003) (arguing that despite
many courts recognizing the ability for same-sex couples to adopt, “it still seems
true that in family law cases involving a homosexual parent, the result ‘will be
determined more than anything else by the state in which the person lives and
the judge who hears the case’”).
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2711 does not apply to second-parent adoptions when the legal
parent, who is a party to the adoption, wishes to retain their
parental rights, harms the children at issue because the rule fails to
extend the full protection of the law to children existing in these
non-traditional families.156 A categorical holding refusing to apply
the parental termination clause in second-parent adoption cases
would provide these families a buttress, which would allow them
to thrive under the same legal protections given to traditionally
structured families.157
A. The Best Interest of the Child
The purpose of the Adoption Act is to serve the best interest of
the child.158 The analysis of the best interest of the child standard,
used to determine the appropriateness of adoption, focuses on the
emotional, physical, and mental needs and welfare of the child.159
Interestingly, no statutory provision denies same-sex couples from
jointly adopting a child who has no legal parents.160 For example,
section 2312 of the adoption law says, “anyone may adopt.”161
Prohibiting adoptions merely because the children are either the
biological or adopted children of one of the partners prior to filing
of the adoption petition is illogical when juxtaposed with same-sex
156

See Becker, supra note 17, at 168 (arguing that a child may experience
material and psychological deprivation if the de facto parent relationship is not
legally recognized through adoption).
157
See Unif. Adoption Act, supra note 60 (stating that the states should
“clarify the legal and economic consequences of different types of adoption so
that, within these formal structures, the emotional and psychological aspects of
adoptive parent and child relationships can flourish”).
158
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2723 (West 2001) (stating that the court
“[s]hall decide the desirability of an adoption on the basis of the physical,
mental, and emotional needs and welfare of the child”); In re Adoption of Hess,
608 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1992) (stating that the Adoption Act “clearly focuses on
the needs of the child”).
159
In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1992); see also 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2723 (defining the best interest of the child standard).
160
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002).
161
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312 (1981) (stating “any individual may
become an adopting parent”).
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couples’ ability to adopt a child with no legal parents.162
Moreover, the adoption of a child by the parent’s same-sex
partner would only benefit the child, particularly when the parents
and children want the adoption to go forward.163 The court in In re
Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.G. stated, “It is a settled rule that in the
construction of statutes, an interpretation is never to be adopted
that would defeat the purpose of the enactment, if any other
reasonable construction can be found which its language will fairly
bear.”164 The best interest of the child, the primary purpose of the
enactment, is served by having two legally recognized parents
because adoption offers greater emotional and financial security.165
The law should recognize the de facto parent-child relationship
between a child and her parent’s same-sex partner to protect the
two from “remaining strangers in the eyes of the law.”166
A recent study by the American Academy of Pediatrics found
that the legal endorsement provided by second-parent adoption
achieves the following:
1. Guarantees that the second-parent’s custody rights and
responsibilities will be protected if the first parent were to
die or become incapacitated. Moreover, second-parent
adoption protects the child’s legal right of relationship with
both parents. In the absence of coparent adoption, members
162

See Strasser, supra note 47, at 1046 (commenting on the absurdity of
laws that allow gay and lesbian individuals to adopt but prohibit gay and lesbian
couples from doing the same.).
163
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1203.
164
Id. (citing In re McQuinston’s Adoption, 86 A. 205, 206 (Pa. 1913)).
165
See Glennon, supra note 30, at 260 (arguing that children do better
emotionally if they have two legal parents); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d
315, 317 (Mass. 1993) (explaining that adoption would not result in any tangible
change in the child’s daily life but would entitle her to inheritance, support, and
insurance from non-biological mother, and would grant the non biological
mother custody if the biological mother died).
166
See Becker, supra note 17, at 116 (arguing that a child may experience
material and psychological deprivation if the de facto parent relationship is not
legally recognized through adoption); see also Jacobs, supra note 9, at 350
(stating that the failure of the court to recognize the actual parental relationship
in these second-parent cases means that many of these people are treated as
mere third parties rather than as the parent they are to the child).
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of the family of the legal parent, should he or she become
incapacitated, might successfully challenge the surviving
coparent’s right to continue to parent the child, thus causing
the child to lose both parents.
2. Protects the second-parent’s right to custody and
visitation if the couple separates. Likewise, the child’s right
to maintain relationships with both parents after separation,
viewed as important to the positive outcome in separation
or divorce of heterosexual parents, would be protected for
families with gay or lesbian parents.
3. Establishes the requirement for child support from both
parents in the event of the parents’ separation.
4. Ensures the child’s eligibility for health benefits from
both parents.
5. Provides legal grounds for either parent to provide
consent for medical care and to make education, health
care, and other important decisions on behalf of the child.
6. Creates the basis for financial security for children in the
event of the death of either parent by ensuring eligibility to
all appropriate entitlements, such as Social Security
survivor benefits.167
Based on these findings, the American Academy of Pediatrics
supports legislative and legal efforts that provide the possibility for
second-parent adoption.168 Additionally, the Uniform Adoption
167

AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
The American Academy of Pediatrics and its member pediatricians
dedicate their efforts and resources to the health, safety and well-being
of all infants, children, adolescents and young adults. The AAP has
57,000 members in the United States, Canada and Latin America.
Members include pediatricians, pediatric medical subspecialists and
pediatric surgical specialists. More than 41,000 members are boardcertified and are called Fellows of the American Academy of
Pediatrics.
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, AAP Fact Sheet, available at http://www.aap.org/
visit/facts.htm (last modified Jan. 5, 2004). See also supra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text (discussing the report).
168
AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
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Act of 1994 seeks to approve second-parent adoptions where there
is a demonstrable connection between the child and parent and it is
in the best interest of the child.169
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, while making strides in
supporting second-parent adoption, could have better served the
appellants in R.B.F., future litigants, as well as the children
involved, if they had followed the recommendations of the
American Academy of Pediatrics and established clear standards
on how to determine cause that would allow for simple approval of
same-sex adoption.170 Had the court categorically held that the
parental termination clause of section 2711 does not apply to
second-parent adoptions where the legal parent is a party to the
adoption and wishes to retain his parental rights, the purpose of the
Adoption Act to serve the “best interest of the child” would be met
by granting two parents legal responsibility for the child.171
Professor Jane Schacter maintains that in analyzing the issues
raised by second-parent adoption, “the question for the court
should be whether the child will receive the added legal, emotional
and financial benefits that would result from acquiring a second
legal (as opposed to merely functional) parent.”172 By failing to
establish clear standards and properly frame the analysis, the court
leaves future litigants in same-sex adoption cases uncertain about
where they stand in the eyes of the law.173

169

See Unif. Adoption Act, supra note 60.
See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4 (arguing that
because these kinds of adoption cases are decided mainly by the courts on a
case-by-case basis, “it is important that a broad ethical mandate exist nationally
that will guide the courts in providing necessary protection for children through
coparent adoption”).
171
See Jacobs, supra note 9, at 391 (concluding that categorical acceptance
of second-parent adoption after initially determining that the parent/child
relationship exists and is healthy provides the most supportive environment for
these families both legally and emotionally).
172
Schacter, supra note 44, at 942.
173
See Morley, Albert, Kneedler & Pereira, supra note 155, at 169
(discussing the confusion caused by current second-parent adoption law).
170
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B. The Rights of the Natural Parent and Finality of Adoption

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that appellants
should be given an opportunity at an evidentiary hearing to
demonstrate cause as to whether the purpose of Section 2711(d)’s
relinquishment of the parental rights component is unnecessary or
whether it is satisfied because of the individual situation.174 The
purpose of the relinquishment provision is to protect the rights of
biological parents and promote finality so the new family can
develop in peace.175 When the appellants have refused to relinquish
their parental rights because they want to remain legally bound, it
is superfluous to require appellants to show why it is unnecessary
for them to relinquish those rights.176 A court considering the
unique situation of a second-parent adoption need not be
concerned with either protecting the natural parents or promoting
finality. Protecting the natural parent’s rights is a non-issue when
they are a party to the petition for adoption and wish for the
adoption by their same-sex partner to take place. Severing the
natural parent’s rights instead decreases the legal protection
extended to the child.177 Moreover, promoting finality of adoption
proceedings is actually accomplished when a second-parent
adoption is granted because the family already exists, giving the
legal parent, who is a party to the petition, no reason to challenge it
later.178
The court should have held that the termination clause from

174

See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing the
implications of intentionally omitting the consent in the trial court cases).
175
See In re Adoption of E.M.A., 409 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1979) (holding that a
parent’s qualified consent to an adoption of his child by another who is not his
spouse is not permissible under the law).
176
In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002)
(“When the requisite cause is demonstrated, Section 2901 affords the trial court
discretion to decree the adoption without termination of the legal parent’s rights
under Section 2711(d).”).
177
See Unif. Adoption Act, supra note 60, § 2-401-409 (discussing the
legal protections extended to a child when second-parent adoptions are granted).
178
See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass. 1993) (explaining
that adoption would not result in any tangible change in the child’s daily life).
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section 2711 does not apply in proceedings where the natural
parent is both a party to, and in support of, the petition for adoption
because the necessary cause has been shown by the fact of their
participation in the petition. 179 The trial court should then have
analyzed the best interest of the child to determine if this particular
parent has the emotional and financial interests beneficial to the
child warranting approval of the petition.180 Rather than focusing
on irrelevant statutory requirements, the court should instead
evaluate whether the non-biological or non-adoptive petitioner has
performed the obligations of parenthood for a substantial period of
time and whether the relationship between the parent and child is
publicly recognized. The court should consider whether the child
believes the second-parent to be their parent.181 If the potential
adoptive parent has performed these obligations and the
relationship is publicly recognized, then the intent of the
petitioners to become legally bound to the child through adoption
should be effectuated.182

179

In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000), vacated by In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa.
2002) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (holding that the Pennsylvania legislature, in
enacting section 2903, has already recognized that the trial judges who are on
the front lines of these adoption proceedings are best situated to determine an
appropriate procedure to follow in cases where there is a void of authority in the
Adoption Act).
180
See In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1993). The court stated:
[W]hile the families of the past may have seemed simple formations
repeated with uniformity (the so called “traditional family”) families
have always been complex, multifaceted, and often idealized. This
court recognizes that families differ in both size and shape and within
and among the many cultural and socio-economic layers that make up
this society. We cannot continue to pretend that there is one formula,
one correct pattern that should constitute a family in order to achieve
the supportive, loving environment we believe children should inhabit.
Id. at 554-55.
181
Jacobs, supra note 9, at 390.
182
See Duncan, supra note 3, at 66 (citing J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)) (finding that a same-sex partner standing “in loco
parentis” to a child could seek partial custody if it would serve the best interest
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A rule that grants these adoptions supports a beneficial
relationship between prospective adoptive parent and child, and
protects a natural parent’s liberty interest in their parental rights. A
rule such as this would also speed the inquiry as to the fitness of
the adoptive parents because it would skip the examination of
whether cause has been shown to determine if the petition could go
forward, and instead would initially examine whether the parent is
actually fit. An expedited process would effectuate the best interest
of the child by shortening the time in which the child is without the
protection of two legal parents.183
The court’s failure to set a clear mandate that allows for samesex adoption when the best interest of the child criteria is met fails
the state’s children who are part of non-traditional families.184
While their decision to remand the case was correct, the court
should have gone further to protect the children and effectuate the
purpose of the Adoption Act by acknowledging that second-parent
adoptions are generally in the best interest of the child,
recognizable under current statutory law and therefore legitimate in
Pennsylvania.
IV. LEGISLATIVE ACTION OR LACK THEREOF
The legislature should protect the best interests of the state, the
children and the greater society by codifying second-parent
adoption.185 The law must acknowledge and reflect the reality that
non-traditional families are raising children regardless of whether
or not their petitions for adoption are approved.186 Statutes that in
of the child because the child has established a strong psychological bond with
the person, and the petitioner has lived with the child and provided care, nurture
and affection, assuming in the child’s eye a statue like that of a parent).
183
See Becker, supra note 17, at 133 (discussing the benefits for the child
when the adoption is quickly adjudicated).
184
See Glennon, supra note 30, at 271 (arguing that a court’s focus should
be on how the child will best thrive, not on what the particular family format
should look like).
185
See In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993).
186
See Becker, supra note 17, at 128 (arguing that a child may experience
material and psychological deprivation if the de facto parent relationship is not
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practice deny adoption petitions by same-sex couples discriminate
against them and their families, and in turn, sometimes fail to
implement what is best for the child.187 Denial of these petitions
harms the children emotionally by depriving them of the greatest
protection under the law—it denies the children two legal
parents.188 The legislature has a duty to clarify any ambiguities in
the law to offer the highest level of legal protection to its
children.189 At a minimum, the legislature should make clear that it
does not support second-parent adoption so that ambiguities about
its legality are eliminated, and equal protection challenges can go
forward.190
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL)191 recently supported the movement urging
legislatures to support second-parent adoptions by approving the

legally recognized through adoption); see also Schacter, supra note 44, at 942
(discussing the desirability of the law recognizing second-parents).
187
In re Adoption of C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 735 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000), vacated by In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa.
2002) (Johnson dissenting) (stating that courts should design rules to serve
children’s best interest and by failing to do so, they perpetuate the fiction of
family homogeneity at the expense of the children whose reality does not fit this
form).
188
See Morley, Albert, Kneedler & Pereira, supra note 155, at 199
(discussing the status and implications of state laws for and against secondparent adoptions).
189
AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that it is
important that a broad ethical mandate exist nationally that will guide policy
makers in creating initiatives that establish permanency for the children of samesex partners through second-parent adoption).
190
See Schacter, supra note 44, at 946-47 (“It is reasonable . . . to ask
legislatures to be unmistakably clear if their will is to block second-parent
adoption. Doing so would clarify the statutory issue, as well as force the
constitutional question of whether children or their parents have any protected
right to use the adoption laws made available to other families.”).
191
See MATTHEW BENDER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE (2001) (stating
that “NCCUSL is a non-profit organization of state legislators, judges, lawyers,
and law professors appointed by the governors of every state for the purpose of
drafting and proposing uniform state legislation on topics normally subject to
state legislative authority”).
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Uniform Adoption Act (UAA).192 The Act attempts to manage the
changing psychosocial and economic aspects of contemporary
adoption by addressing the many different kinds of adoption that
now occur and the various functions they serve.193 Moreover, the
Act encourages secure relationships between children and
individuals committed to parenting them.194 The American
Academy of Pediatrics recommends that state legislatures take
proactive measures to approve second-parent adoption and protect
children in second-parent family situations.195 If the legislature
amended the law to explicitly authorize second-parent adoption,
courts would not need to employ statutory interpretation to furnish
the legal protection that adoption offers.196 Legislative action
would help define the best interest of the child standard and
preempt conflicting lower court decisions in second-parent
adoption cases.197 A clear statutory provision would also establish
the right for these children to have two parents legally obligated to
care for them and recognize that these situations, though
unconventional, are a reality for a growing number of children.198
CONCLUSION
Many gay and lesbian couples with children are still striving to
create integrated families under the confines of adoption laws, and
192
193

See Unif. Adoption Act, supra note 60, at § 2-401-409.
See MATTHEW BENDER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note

191.
194

Id.
AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (concluding that
the weight of evidence gathered during several decades showed children raised
by lesbian or gay couples were normal and healthy and thus supporting the legal
adoption of children by second-parents).
196
Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739, 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)
(Todd, J., dissenting) (stating that no legal mechanism other than adoption can
offer the legal protection of existing familiar bonds, financial protection and two
parents to these children).
197
See Morley, Albert, Kneedler & Pereira, supra note 155, at 197
(discussing the confusion caused by current second-parent adoption law).
198
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the growing
number of same-sex parents).
195
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they often continue to be rebuffed.199 The court’s decision in
R.B.F. makes possible legal recognition of the second-parent, but
by failing to give the trial court categorical standards for approving
second-parent adoption, the precedent offers limited support in
promoting the best interest of the child.200 The Pennsylvania
legislature should revisit the issue of qualified consent in secondparent adoptions to bring the law in line with reality and maximize
the legal protection available to children.
Second-parent adoption effectuates the main purpose of the
Adoption Act to promote the best interest of the child.201 Denying
legal recognition to these families unfairly burdens them. To
rectify this injustice, the state legislature should either codify
approval of second-parent adoption, or the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania should categorically approve them to lift the
injustice. Only then will these families be secure in their status
under the law. The security provided by legal adoptive status is a
vital step in upholding the statutory policy of protecting the best
interest of the child.202
199

See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.L.P., 16 Fiduc. Rep.2d 95, 98 (Montg. Co.
Orphans’ Ct. Pa. 1998) (rejecting the application of a lesbian partner to become
an adoptive parent of a child).
200
See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing the
implications of a categorical standard).
201
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2723 (West 2001) (stating that the court
“[s]hall decide the desirability of an adoption on the basis of the physical,
mental, and emotional needs and welfare of the child”); In re Adoption of Hess,
608 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1992) (stating that the Adoption Act “clearly focuses on
the needs of the child”).
202
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2724(a)-(b) (West 2001) (setting forth
factors taken into account in evaluating the child’s best interests). Section
2724(b) states that:
The court shall hear testimony in support of the petition and such
additional testimony as it deems necessary to inform it as to the
desirability of the proposed adoption . . . . In any case, the age, sex,
health, social and economic status or racial, ethnic or religious
background of the child or adopting parents shall not preclude an
adoption but the court shall decide its desirability on the basis of the
physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
Id.

